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ABSTRACT 
 
Can media have any influence on firm performance? Do firms in countries with more independent 
media perform better than firms with less independent media? This paper seeks to answer these 
questions by documenting the relationship between media independence and firm performance in 
emerging markets. Using a dataset from twenty seven emerging markets, we show significantly 
better performance of firms headquartered in countries with relatively more independent media 
than firms headquartered in countries with relatively less independent media during the period 
between 2007 and 2011. We argue that independent media reduces information asymmetries for 
stock market participants. Consequently, it is more difficult for managers to expropriate, thereby 
improving performance of firms. Our results indicate that media can play a substitute role for 
traditional governance mechanisms in emerging markets. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
merging markets are characterized by high information asymmetries. Luez et al. (2003), for instance, 
document that managers do not disclose the true information about their firms in emerging markets. In 
another related study, Fan and Wong (2002) document similar findings by showing that the quality of 
information disclosure, measured by the relation between reported earnings and stock returns, is low in emerging 
markets.1 These findings have given rise to a vast amount of literature that is aimed at identifying the mechanisms 
via which information environment of firms can be improved. This strand of literature has identified several 
country-specific as well as firm-specific factors behind inefficient information environment in emerging markets.2 
Luez et al. (2003), for example, relate information asymmetries with country-level factors and document that 
information environment of a firm improves with improvement in investor protection mechanisms. They argue that 
strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private benefits, thereby reducing their incentives to hide firm 
performance. While, Bae and Jeong (2007) highlight the importance of firm-specific factors by reporting that quality 
of disclosure is weaker for firms that are affiliated with business groups. They also document that firms with foreign 
ownership have lower information asymmetries.  
 
An important factor that has, however, eluded prior literature is how the extent of media independence – a 
country-specific factor – effect information environment of firms. Given that the media is a channel via which 
information gets transmitted to a large segment of society, it is intuitive to believe that media should play an 
                                                
1 An important implication of low information disclosure is the presence of high information asymmetries and agency problems within firms in 
emerging markets. Mitton (2002) argue that high information asymmetries adversely affect firm performance. He shows that firms with higher 
disclosure quality (ADRs and auditors from big-six accounting firms) outperform other firms. 
2 Claessens and Fan (2003) conduct survey of literature and report that concentrated ownership structures, presence of family firms, cronyism, 
inadequate governance mechanisms, and ineffective institutional framework are some of the more important factors that lead to poor information 
environment of firms in emerging markets. 
E 
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important role in altering the information environment of firms in any economy.3 In a related study, Bushee et al. 
(2010) document that media has the ability to reduce information asymmetries. They argue that media has the ability 
to shape a firm’s information environment by packaging and disseminating information, as well as by creating new 
information through journalism activities. Dyck and Zingales (2002) also argue along similar lines when they report 
that media is a channel via which information is aggregated and credibly communicated to the public. This strand of 
literature argues that media’s ability to diffuse information to a wider audience creates an information environment 
where informed investors have very limited information leverage. Lower difference between information content 
possessed by informed investors and information content possessed by uninformed investors leads to more efficient 
prices. Rogers et al. (2013) show that media have a significant economic impact on securities markets in terms of the 
price formation process. 
 
Basic assumption in the above strand of literature is that the media is able to credibly transmit information 
to the public. We argue that credibility of the media is synonymous to its independence. Media that is not 
independent can compromise on the quality of information being disclosed and disseminated to the public. 
Waisboard (1995), for instance, argue that less independent media is more inclined to distort and manipulate 
information, in order to prevent consumers from making informed decisions. In this paper, we argue that it is the 
quality of media, which is how independent and objective the media is, rather than the media coverage that should 
define the relationship between reduction in information asymmetries and media. If the media is not independent, 
we should not expect the media coverage to cause any improvement in information asymmetries.4 Our arguments 
are consistent with Duta and Roy (2013) who argue that media independence insures that information disseminated 
by the media is unbiased. They show that countries where media are not free tend to have a biased information 
environment even if the access of information is easy. Therefore, it is not the coverage but the independence of 
media that should be of prime determinant of superior information environment. Duta and Roy (2013) argue that the 
media that communicates freely is more likely to increase accountability and transparency, thereby improving the 
information environment. 
 
Given that information asymmetries constitute important determinants of firm performance, this paper aims 
to extend the earlier literature by documenting the impact of media independence on firm performance in emerging 
markets. Our paper is similar in spirit to Farooq (2013). However, an important limitation of his analysis is the 
narrow definition of media independence. His definition of media independence depends on the extent of 
government ownership of the media.5 His variable of media independence overlooks the surrounding environment 
and country-specific conditions that can have a significant impact on the independence of media. Furthermore, he 
conducts a cross-sectional study covering one year period of 1999. Unlike Farooq (2013), we analyze a panel data 
covering the period between 2007 and 2011 with a more comprehensive definition of media independence. After 
controlling for potential endogeneity problem of media independence, our results confirm the findings of Farooq 
(2013) and show significantly better performance of firms headquartered in countries with relatively more 
independent media than firms headquartered in countries with relatively less independent media. Our results also 
show that all aspect of media independence – economic, legal, and political – is equally important for firm 
performance. We argue that the positive impact of media independence on firm performance is driven by the fact 
that independent media is able to reduce information asymmetries between firms and investors (Bushee et al., 2010). 
Lower information asymmetries should induce managers to work in the best interest of shareholders. Dyck and 
Zingales (2002) argue that media reduce information asymmetries by bringing into attention any wrong doings of 
                                                
3 This should be, especially, true in emerging markets where tradition mechanisms of information transmission, such as financial analysts, are not 
very strong. One of the reasons for this might be low demand of analyst services in emerging markets. Giannetti and Koskinen (2005) document 
that only 3.3% of Indian population invests in stock market, while this statistics is 1.2% for Turkey and 2.3% for Sri Lanka. Low participation of 
individuals in stock markets should lead to lower demand of analyst services. Claessens and Fan (2003) also report that there is inadequate 
amount of research on the role of financial analysts in emerging markets.  
4 Islam (2002) notes that media has to independent, if it claims to have any beneficial impact on society. He also argues that the key element to 
independence is objectivity. Once the independence of media is altered, it becomes hard to identify any benefit of the media. 
5 Farooq (2013) argues that state-owned media is less independent and is more inclined to distort and manipulate information. However, we are 
also aware of the second school of thought – the public interest (Pigouvian) theory. This school of thoughts argues that state ownership of the 
media (even as a monopoly) is desirable for a number of reasons. First, if consumers are ignorant and if private media outlets serve the ruling 
elites, then state ownership of media can expose public to less biased, more complete, and more accurate information. Second, information is a 
public good and once it is supplied to some consumers, it is costly to keep it away from others, even if they have not paid for it. Therefore, 
government is more suited to own media than private entities. 
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managers to the wider segment of society. As a result, media discipline the managers and positively impact firm 
performance. 
 
Our results have implications are rich in policy implications. Our results imply that policy makers should 
also make efforts to strengthen unconventional institutions, such as media, if they want to improve information 
environments of their countries. Furthermore, our results also indicate that media independence is important publicly 
available information that investors should take into consideration while deciding how much capital to allocate to 
which country. Our arguments in this paper also provide direction for future research. If our arguments regarding 
information environment and media independence are true, media independence should also exert significant 
influence of the informativeness of reported earnings and traditional governance mechanisms, such as choice of 
auditors and dividend payout ratios. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses motivation and background 
of this study. Section 3 summarizes the data. Section 4 presents assessment of our hypothesis and Section 5 
discusses our results. The paper ends with Section 6 where we present conclusions. 
 
2. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Media And Media Independence 
 
Information is the key to efficient functioning of the stock markets (Stiglitz, 2000). Securities get priced 
correctly when all relevant information about firms enters the market. Therefore, any mechanism that can affect the 
disclosure and dissemination of information should be value relevant for stock market participants.6 This paper aims 
to bring into focus the role media plays in improving the information environment of firms. Djankov et al. (2003) 
classifies media as an information intermediary whose main goal is to provide the public with collected information. 
Within this goal, media performs tasks such as broadcasting, wrapping, and producing of information (Bushee et al., 
2009). Dyck and Zingales (2002) argue that, in today’s market place, the importance of media has exceeded so much 
that investors’ decisions are more guided by media content than by other key financial criteria. 
 
Prior literature argues that media is only able to perform its tasks efficiently if it is independent. Biased 
media can obscure the motives and interests behind corporate decisions. Dash (2012) note that biased media may not 
information that can damage firms with which they have direct business deals such as advertising. In a recent study, 
Dutta and Roy (2012) make the distinction between media independence and media exposure/coverage and note that 
media exposure makes sure that information is reachable and media independence insures this information is 
unbiased. To emphasize their point, they show that in countries where media is categorized as not free, wide access 
to media is not sufficient to reduce particular governance violations. We argue that the market understands that 
media exposure/coverage does not necessarily mean that information being disseminated in correct. Behrman and 
Roy (2011) points out that, for a media to be effective, it should be able to communicate unbiased information. Only 
unbiased reporting will ensure the beneficial impact of media. We argue that unbiased reporting promotes the 
involvement of shareholders, consumers and the public in corporate decisions. Consequently, those corporate 
decisions that negatively impact shareholders can be prevented. Brunetti and Weder (2003) note that dissemination 
of unbiased information can acts as a powerful tool of control against any wrongdoings. Islam (2002) identifies 
objectivity as the key element to media quality. He reports that media independence is all about reporting 
information in the most impartial manner. Therefore, we argue that the more independent is media, the more 
objectivity is achieved and the more quality is guaranteed eventually. 
 
  
                                                
6 As an example, consider financial analysts. Financial analysts play an important role in this process by bringing out new information about 
firms to investors. Under normal circumstances, investors view analysts’ research reports, forecasts, and recommendations as relatively accurate 
sources of information and use them in their investment decisions. 
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2.2 Media Independence And Information Asymmetries/Information Environment 
 
Prior literature discusses media for its various roles, ranging from fight against corruption to economic 
development to religious tolerance (Besley et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2002; Anam, 2002).7 As a result, media is 
supposed to have significant impact on any society. In this paper, we attempt to discuss the capacity of media as a 
channel via which information asymmetries regarding firms can be reduced. Prior literature argues that media helps 
in reducing information asymmetries by acting as a disciplining device. Dyck and Zingales (2002), for instance, 
suggest that media can play a significant role in inducing managers to act in the best interest of shareholders. They 
argue that media can create significant pressure on managers by bringing into public attention any wrongdoings 
done by managers. They consider public attention as the main reason behind disciplining the managers.8 In another 
related study, Dyck et al. (2008) conclude that exposing breaches of corporate governance in media significantly 
reduce the violation of governance mechanisms. They also argue that media attention induces managers to refrain 
from any wrongdoings. Kahan and Rock (2007) also reach the same conclusion as Dyck and Zingales (2002) and 
Dyck et al. (2008), when they document the positive link between media exposure/coverage and scrupulous 
behavior of management.  
 
Prior literature highlights number of channels via which media exercises its governance/disciplining role. 
Some of them are listed below: 
 
• We argue that independent exposure/coverage of events happening within firms by media can discipline 
managers via its impact on their reputation. Becker (1968) suggests that a manager will refrain from actions 
that destroy shareholder wealth if the perceived private benefits are smaller than reputational damage. Fama 
(1980) also considers concerns for reputation as one of the most important channel that can discipline 
managers. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that, when it comes to act in accordance with corporate 
governance principles, management has more apprehension for their reputation than for legal penalties. 
Plentiful of examples in the prior literature show that the resulting embarrassment caused by media 
coverage considerably decreases expropriation activities (Monks and Minnow, 1995). SK Telecom, for 
instance, is an interesting case where media campaign not only helped in stopping expropriation but also 
forced firm to improve its governance practices. In another case, the Board of Directors of Sears Roebuck 
succumbed to the ad campaign launched against their inappropriate behavior (Dyck and Zingales, 2002).  
• Another important reason behind the strong relationship between media independence and information 
environment is the political concerns of lawmakers and regulators. Dyck and Zingales (2002) argue that 
media exposure can push political leaders to act as per good corporate governance practices and increase 
law enforcement in an attempt to protect their political careers. This is to say that the stakes are high when 
media coverage is involved. 
 
However, as was argued earlier, all of these benefits of media exposure/coverage can only be realized if 
media coverage is independent and free of any bias. Dutta and Roy (2012) document that, for media to be that 
effective, it has be independent and unbiased. IN this paper, we posit that disciplining role played by media, 
eventually, translates into lower information asymmetries. In a recent study, Kalenborn and Lessmann (2012) 
consider an environment with symmetric information as synonymous to an environment of high degree of media 
independence. In another related study, Chen (2005) documents that the degree of asymmetric information can 
substitute the degree of media independence in a particular economy by showing that media independence is 
responsible for lower asymmetric information.9 Consistent with above findings, Vishawanath and Kaufmann (1999) 
also indentifies media as one of the key ways to lower information asymmetries. Oxelheim (2006) argues that lower 
information asymmetries enhance the ability of external investors to evaluate a particular firm’s activities in the 
most accurate way. This means that more independent media lead to higher transparency which leads to higher 
reduction of information asymmetry and contributes to have better informed investors. 
                                                
7 Besley et al. (2002) argue that free media bridges the gap between the government and its citizens. Djankov et al. (2002) report that media has 
the ability to reduce corruption. Anam (2002) considers media as a tool to fight religious extremism.  
8 Dyck and Zingales (2002) cite number of examples to prove their arguments. One such example was the case of SK Telecom in which the 
media exposure was the main reason that restrained people involved from unethical activities. 
9 Chen (2005) also relates independent media with lower adverse selection problem. Conventional arguments would suggest that lower adverse 
selection should result in a better performance. 
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2.3 Media Independence, Information Environment And Firm Performance 
 
Our arguments, thus far, have established the fact that media independence leads to lower information 
asymmetries via its impact on manager’s reputation. Being ashamed publicly acts as a deterrent and induces 
managers to refrain from any unscrupulous behavior. This paper argues that lower information asymmetries arising 
due to media independence should also have a positive impact on firm performance. Given that information 
asymmetries misalign the goals of managers and shareholders by creating conflicting objectives between the two, 
we should expect firms with lower information asymmetries to perform better than firms with higher information 
asymmetries. Johnson et al. (2000) show that country-specific measures of the information environment are 
positively related to firm performance in emerging markets. In particular, they find that firms located in 
environments with low information asymmetries are more likely to perform well in comparison to firms 
headquartered in environments with high information asymmetries. They conclude that a poor information 
environment can lead managers to misuse resources. Consistent with Johnson et al. (2000), Lemmon and Lins 
(2003) show that stock returns of firms in which managers have high level of control rights, but lower cash flow 
ownership, are significantly lower than other firms. Klapper and Love (2004) confirm the same results by 
documenting that higher market valuation and better operating performance is strongly related with governance and 
information environment in emerging markets. These studies argue that better information environment minimizes 
agency problems and improve firm performance by not allowing managers to expropriate.  
 
Furthermore, conventional wisdom suggests that investors react to economically significant news related to 
firms. Prior literature also documents statistically significant correlations between publication of price-sensitive 
information and price movements. Beneish (1991) and Barber and Odean (2008) conclude that the US retail 
investors give high importance to information revealed in media. In another related study, Huth and Maris (1992) 
find that media tips about firms, especially smaller firm, have a significant impact on stock prices. The media not 
only keeps the existing investors up to date on information about firms, but also attracts potential investors into the 
market via various ways. Merton (1987) observes that the attention of investors is not distributed equally across the 
market. The media, therefore, plays an important role in channeling investors’ attention. Given that the media’s 
narrative about firms has a large audience, it may induce some of investors who are not the current shareholders to 
invest in firms. This increased interest from investors may also result in better performance. Therefore, consistent 
with above argument, we hypothesize that firms headquartered in countries with more independent media should 
outperform firms headquartered in less independent media. 
 
3. DATA 
 
This paper documents the relationship between media independence and firm performance in twenty-seven 
emerging stock markets. The sample consists of firms from Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela), Asia (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, 
United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam), Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Turkey), 
and Africa (Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia). The sample period for this research is from 2007 to 2011. We 
describe our dataset in the following subsections. 
 
3.1 Firm Performance 
 
This paper measures firm performance by the market-adjusted returns (RET). We measure RET by the 
difference between stock returns and market returns. Stock price data and the corresponding market index data is 
obtained for the first and the last day of the year to compute RET. The data for these items is obtained from the 
Datastream.  
 
3.2 Media Independence 
 
This paper uses the data provided by the Freedom House to measure media independence (MEDIA). The 
data maintained by the Freedom House are survey data, spanning over a large period of time. It is one of the most 
comprehensive dataset available on media freedom. The Freedom House uses the data at its disposal to access the 
media freedom record of each country. Based on its assessment, the Freedom House provides an annual ranking for 
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each country. The ranking aims to capture the extent to which the media is free in each country. The data provided 
by the Freedom House is also widely used in prior literature (Dutta and Roy, 2009; Petrova, 2008; Leeson, 
2008).We would like to mention here that the ranking provided by the Freedom House does not provide evidence of 
media quality. 
 
The index used to measure media freedom is based on twenty three methodology questions divided into the 
following three categories:  
 
• Legal environment: This category assesses all laws and regulations of a particular country that could be 
used to control media content and the capacity of media actors to work freely and independently.   
• Political environment: This category examines the extent to which political powers can influence the 
content of news. It inspects the independence of media, censorship, harassment, threats and pressure on 
media actors.  
• Economic environment: This category looks also at the independence of media in terms of ownership, 
transparency, and operation activities such as production, distribution, and advertising.  
 
The Freedom House provides numerical ratings and rates the independence level of a country’s media as 
free, partly free, or not free. The ranking assigns numerical values between 0 and 100 points – 0 being the most free 
and 100 being the least free. The descriptive statistics for media freedom in the countries represented in our dataset 
are provided in Table 1. The results show that, on average, European emerging markets have more free media than 
the other emerging markets. Our results also show that media in Asian and African emerging markets is the least 
free. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics For Media Independence 
Countries Y2007 Y2008 Y2009 Y2010 Y2011 
Latin America      
Argentina 47 49 49 51 50 
Chile 30 29 30 29 31 
Colombia 59 59 60 56 55 
Mexico 51 55 60 62 62 
Peru 44 44 44 43 44 
Venezuela 74 73 75 76 76 
Average 50.83 51.50 53.00 52.83 53.00 
      
Asia      
Bahrain 71 71 71 72 84 
Jordan 63 64 63 63 63 
Kuwait 54 55 55 57 57 
Oman 71 71 71 71 71 
Pakistan 66 62 61 61 63 
Philippines 45 45 48 46 42 
Qatar 64 65 66 66 67 
Saudi Arabia 81 82 83 83 84 
Thailand 56 57 58 62 60 
United Arab Emirates 68 69 71 71 72 
Vietnam 82 83 82 83 84 
Average 65.54 65.81 66.27 66.81 67.90 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Countries Y2007 Y2008 Y2009 Y2010 Y2011 
Europe      
Czech Republic 18 18 18 19 19 
Hungary 21 21 23 30 36 
Poland 24 24 24 25 25 
Romania 44 44 43 42 41 
Russia 78 80 81 81 80 
Turkey 51 50 51 54 55 
Average 39.33 39.50 40.00 41.83 42.67 
      
Africa      
Egypt 59 60 60 65 57 
Morocco 64 64 66 68 68 
Nigeria 53 54 54 52 50 
Tunisia 81 82 85 85 51 
Average 64.25 65 66.25 67.5 56.5 
 
3.3 Control Variables 
 
This paper uses number of firm-specific characteristics as control variables. These variables are:  
 
• SIZE: It is defined as log of firm’s total assets. Conventional wisdom suggests that large firms have lower 
agency problems due to increased interest from stock market participants (investors and analysts). Lower 
agency problems should lead to better performance of large firms (Fang et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
Bhattacharyya and Saxena (2009) argue that larger firms have more bargaining power over their suppliers 
and competitors, thereby improving their performance. 
• LEVERAGE: It is defined as total debt to total assets ratio. High level of debt exposes firms to greater 
financial risk. High risk should result in lower performance (Mitton, 2002). 
• EPS: It is defined as earnings per share. EPS is an important variable that measures investor interest in a 
firm (Chang et al., 2008). It also measures accounting performance of a firm. Higher investor interest and 
superior accounting performance is expected to translate into better stock price performance. 
• GROWTH: It is defined as the growth in total assets over the last one year. Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) 
document that firms with higher growth have better stock price performance. 
• RoA: It is defined as return on assets. It is an indicator of how efficient management is at using its assets to 
generate earnings. We expect positive impact of RoA on stock prices. 
 
We obtain the date for the above mentioned variables from the Worldscope. Table 2 documents the 
descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the correlation matrix (Panel B) for our control variables. Table 2, Panel A, 
reports no big difference in means and medians for our control variables. The only exception is EPS whose median 
is very close to zero. It suggests that most of the firms in our dataset were not very profitable. Our results in Table 2, 
Panel B, show no severe correlations between our control variables. Therefore, we can include all the variables 
together in any regression equation. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics For Control Variables 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for control variables 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Observations 
SIZE 14.6825 14.4530 3.3531 19444 
LEVERAGE 20.0999 15.5500 19.7597 19037 
EPS 10.8654 0.2200 46.3961 17797 
GROWTH 11.9015 7.1500 26.9029 18692 
RoA 5.4433 5.0600 8.9414 18488 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 SIZE LEVERAGE EPS GROWTH RoA 
SIZE 1.0000     
LEVERAGE 0.1702 1.0000    
EPS 0.2947 -0.0016 1.0000   
GROWTH 0.1097 0.0509 0.0170 1.0000  
RoA 0.1250 -0.1242 0.1005 0.2548 1.0000 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this paper is to document the effect of media independence on firm performance in emerging 
markets. In order to test our hypothesis, we estimate panel regression with firm performance (RET) as a dependent 
variable and media independence (MEDIA) as an independent variable. As indicated above, we also add SIZE, 
LEVERAGE, EPS, GROWTH, and RoA as control variables in our regression equation. To control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we also include dummy variables representing firm-specific fixed effects (FDUM). Our basic 
regression equation takes the following form. We would like to mention here that we believe that media 
independence is not an exogenous variable. Therefore, we allow for the endogenous relationship between media 
independence and firm performance. Media may be more independent in countries with better country-level 
governance environment. Therefore, it is likely that independent media is able to reduce information asymmetries in 
countries with better country-level governance environment. In order to address the endogeneity problem, we 
estimate the following panel regression by using the instrumental variables. The instruments used in our analysis are 
the following: (1) Voice and accountability index, (2) Rule of law index, and (3) Political stability index. All of 
these variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicator (WGI) database. In an unreported 
result, we confirm that our instruments are valid instruments. It is important to mention here that we use panel data 
regression with fixed effects for our analysis. Hausman test is used to decide between fixed effect and random 
effects.  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) εFDUMβ
RoAβGROWTHβEPSβLEVERAGEβSIZEβ
MEDIAβαRET
Fxd
Fxd
65432
1
++
+++++
+=
∑
 (1) 
 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 3. Our results indicate that firm performance is better in 
countries with high media independence. Given that high value of MEDIA corresponds with low media 
independence, we report a significant and negative coefficient of MEDIA. More precisely, our results indicate that 
decrease in media independence by 1 unit causes firm performance to decrease by 0.0111 units. We argue that firms 
headquartered in countries with more independent media have better information environment than firms 
headquartered in countries with less independent media. Our arguments are consistent with prior literature that 
considers independent media as a mechanism that help in reducing information asymmetries through dissemination 
of unbiased information (Dutta and Roy, 2012; Dyck and Zingales, 2002). Consequently, these firms – firms 
headquartered in countries with relatively more independent media – have lower agency problems. Lower agency 
problems, eventually, translate into lower likelihood of expropriations in these firms (Mitton, 2002). Therefore, high 
media independence results into better stock price performance of firms headquartered in countries with more 
independent media. 
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Table 3. Effect Of Media Independence On Firm Performance 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
MEDIA -0.0111*** -2.65 
   
SIZE -0.1255*** -5.98 
LEVERAGE -0.0033** -4.84 
EPS -0.0004* -1.90 
GROWTH 0.0023*** 10.22 
RoA 0.0005*** 2.75 
Fixed Effects Yes 
No. of observations 16201 
F-Value 23.7900 
No. of groups 3880 
R2 within 0.0146 
Note: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
There can be concerns that the results obtained in Table 3 are confined to certain stocks. For instance, small 
firms have higher information asymmetries due to low interest from stock market participants (investors and 
analysts). Therefore, it may be possible that beneficial impact of independent media is more pronounced in these 
firms relative to large firms where information asymmetries are already low. In order to overcome these concerns, 
we divide our sample into two groups – firms with size above the median size of the sample and firms with size 
below the median of the sample. We re-estimate Equation (1) for both groups. Our results, reported in Table 3, show 
that our previous findings of better performance of firms in countries with more independent media holds only in a 
sample of large firms. We report a significant coefficient of MEDIA in a sample of large firms. For small firms, we 
show insignificant impact of media independence on firm performance in a sample of small firms. Our results are 
intuitive because large firms are regular features in financial press and journalists give a better coverage to the large 
firms (Dash, 2012). 
 
Table 4. Effect Of Media Independence On Firm Performance In Different Samples Based On Size 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
MEDIA -0.0337*** -3.02 -0.0044 -1.05 
     
SIZE -0.1140*** -2.95 -0.1558*** -5.37 
LEVERAGE -0.0046*** -4.14 -0.0017* -1.93 
EPS -0.0005** -2.15 -0.0001 -0.21 
GROWTH 0.0023*** 6.29 0.0026*** 8.67 
RoA 0.0009** 2.12 0.0004** 2.01 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
No. of observations 7359 8842 
F-Value 9.9900 18.26 
No. of groups 1941 2156 
R2 within 0.0211 0.0256 
Note: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
5.1 Are All Components Of Media Independence – Economic, Political, Or Legal – Important For Firm 
Performance? 
 
In this section, we replace MEDIA by its individual components (economic, political, or legal) and re-
estimate Equation (1). Our results are reported in Table 5. Our results show that all components of media 
independence are associated with better firm performance. However, out of the three, component of media 
independence related to economic environment exerts stronger impact on firm performance than the others.  
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Table 5. Effect Of Different Aspects Of Media Independence On Firm Performance 
 Legal Environment Political Environment Economic Environment 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
MEDIA -0.0299** -2.08 -0.0245*** -2.57 -0.0404*** -2.94 
       
SIZE -0.1266*** -6.02 -0.1248*** -5.93 -0.1242*** -5.93 
LEVERAGE -0.0033*** -4.84 -0.0033*** -4.85 -0.0033*** -4.84 
EPS -0.0005** -2.09 -0.0004* -1.78 -0.0004* -1.76 
GROWTH 0.0023*** 10.27 0.0023*** 10.08 0.0023*** 10.15 
RoA 0.0005*** 2.69 0.0005*** 2.81 0.0005*** 2.71 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of 
observations 
16201 16201 16201 
F-Value 23.55 23.66 24.00 
No. of groups 3880 3880 3880 
R2 within 0.0157 0.0109 0.0165 
Note: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
5.2 Relationship Between Media Independence And Firm Performance Using Bootstrap Standard Errors 
 
In this section, we estimate Equation (1) by using the method of bootstrapping as an alternative to obtain 
standard errors for estimated parameters. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric approach for evaluating the distribution 
of a statistic based on random resampling. It relies upon the assumption that the current sample is representative of 
the population, and therefore, the empirical distribution function is a nonparametric estimate of the population 
distribution (Guan, 2003). Our results are reported in Table 6. Our results confirm our earlier results of better stock 
price performance of firms headquartered in countries with more independent media. 
 
Table 6. Effect of media independence on firm performance (bootstrap standard errors) 
 Coefficient z-statistic 
MEDIA -0.0111*** -3.14 
   
SIZE -0.1255*** -4.13 
LEVERAGE -0.0033*** -3.67 
EPS -0.0004*** -3.03 
GROWTH 0.0023*** 7.54 
RoA 0.0005 0.26 
Fixed Effects Yes 
No. of observations 16201 
Wald Chi2 279.49 
No. of groups 3880 
R2 within 0.0146 
Note: Coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by * 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explores the relationship between media independence and firm performance in twenty-seven 
emerging market from Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Europe. Our results show that firms headquartered in 
countries with relatively more independent media perform better than firms headquartered in relatively less 
independent media. We argue that firms from countries with relatively more independent media have better 
information environment than their counterpart firms from countries with relatively less independent media. As a 
result, it is hard for managers to expropriate, thereby increasing firm performance in countries with relatively more 
independent media. Our results also show that all aspects of media independence – economic, political, and legal – 
are important determinants of firm performance in emerging markets. Our results are robust across different 
estimation techniques. 
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